Germany created a war zone within the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland so that German sub-marines could sink enemy vessels. The First World War was a devastating war that effected many places and also very many lives.
Because of the effects of the war people were determined to search for the country that was to blame for all the disaster created. The outbreak was contingent on a determining number of factors. These factors included nationalism that was being spread throughout Europe during the time before Wo Germany however, might have suffered the most from a war that claimed the lives of 9 million combatants.
Germany lost more men in this war than any other nation involved. An entire generation of Germans was slaughtered, almost 2 million were killed, and the total number of casualties was over 7 m There are many things that can cause a war. For example, World War One was started because of many things: Nationalism lead to war because Serbia encouraged the pe The treaty looked like a good start but then by the end of it had fallen to dust.
The great treaty that was to bring permanent peace fell apart at the seams. The three main powers at the conference were the United States The German republic was not at the signing.
Included in the first section of t A major part of the history of Europe occurred during and after Napoleon s rule. Napoleon unified Europe, a feeling of nationalism came about that would lead to the creation of new countries. Before the s there was no Italy or Germany. There were many similarities in the unification of both Germany and Italy. They both had hardships and steps to becoming unified. The way they were unifi In the 19th Century Nationalism had a strong up rise in society.
Nationalism is the devotion to the interest or culture of a nation, and the nation would benefit from action independently rather then collectively, emphasizing nation rather then international goals. A lot of countries want to come one with all of the people in the country.
But there were a lot of problems get people to thi Out of the Big Three nations at the treaty of Versailles, France the country which suffered by far the worst during the Great War achieved her aims the best. The French set out to achieve a number of goals, which mainly fell under two categories, security and revenge against Germany.
Just like most countries which fought in this war, France was a country which was dragged into it through the Michelle Brandon My Past: I was born in Calgary, Alberta in then in I moved to Germany. I stayed in Germany for 3 years then I moved to calgary for 2 years. Cakgary is a nice place to live it s a big city compared to Germany.
Germany is a beautiful place to go, I would like to go back to Germany for a visit. I go back to Calgary for a visit in the summer time to see my family an The Versailles treaty had an amazing affect on the future of all the countries in Europe that were a part of World War One.
However, the treaty had the most devastating affect on the future of Germany. The treaty of Versailles essentially made the German people entirely responsible for the First World War. This blame that was put on Germany was one of the main factors responsible for Germ Throughout history, the loser had always been the ultimate evil, especially in a world war, in Germany s case.
However, it is true that Germany did have voluminous responsibilities of starting the war, although she was not the one who sparked off the initial dispute. She was taking part in the imperialistic game, which made rivalries with other overseas empires. She was building an e Authoritarian Government in Germany The Unification of Germany under there the powerful leader Otto Von Bismark led to the Authoritarian style government in Germany for the next forty years through his aggressive and sometimes underhanded leadership qualities.
Bismark united Germany too Prussia not uniting Germany as an equal and fair whole this was the main cause for this new auth This is only the first few lines of this paper. If you would like to view the entire paper you need to register here. Germany seemed to be the victor, gaining control of France and Poland as well as successfully bombing England.
Many people believe that Germany would have indeed won the war if not for the intervention of the United Sta First, after promoting the Gulf War he threw it away. Instead of letting our army complete its victory he ordered it to stop! We lost the opportunity to have an army of occupation dominating the Arab oil fields, not subservient to the Saudi king, and paid for by Iraqi o Josh PelzThe conflicts of the thirty years warSunday May 30, The thirty years war was inevitable because of the unusually high amount of causes that went in to starting the war.
The war began as a civil war and became a struggle for territory and political power. The four main causes of the war were religion, economic, territorial and social. The main countries that were involved we She was building an en The Aims of Germany and Japan The s were a tumultuous time. After World War I, the Allied powers seemed determined to preserve peace, but Germany and Japan held a shared goal of world domination.
In two memorandums about the plans of Germany and Japan, U. He blamed all the economic and social troubles on these groups, Germany had pushed the U.
Germany used unrestricted submarine warfare USW in the oceans against non-army ships. This violated the United States rights for neutrality and angered Americans, Even though Germans living under Bismarck did not have much power when it came to government, I still would have rather lived in Germany than in France during the Third Republic.
France had another bloody revolution in that was suppressed in may of that same year. Throughout the Third Republic not much changed: The government was weak; No really important bills were passed; No fo The similarities between the unification of Germany and the unification of Italy are: Other similarities were after the unifications both countries were ruled by a monarch and the people who were unified generaly felt more loyalty to their local government thanto the new Germany is a German speaking country in central Europe.
Its capital is Berlin. Its flag consists of three colored, horizontal stripes. The colors are black, red, and orange. It has been a united country for only ten years. It became divided during World War II after only 74 years of unification Many agreed that there were to be no more wars hence a treaty was signed. After Germany had surrende Far more devastating than car wrecks, violent crimes or natural disasters, is the tragedy that we call war. More men have lost their lives, broken their dreams and shattered their hope than is possible to fathom.
But far more than death stalks the battlefields. A host of terrors, including homesickness, lonlieness, and the loss of innocence play major roles in soldier's lives. In history classes today elementary, high school, and some in the college or university level as well our teachers rarely give us an in-depth look at events, instead they just give us a quick scan of what happened, when, and why the events mentioned are important.
I have yet to have had a history teacher get deep into the subject matter of a certain event, or chain of events as I would like More Trouble Than Good. In a miserably failed attempt to stop the already ongoing violence during world war one, and prevent further conflict in the region, the Treaty of Versailles was proposed by ex-president Woodrow Wilson.
Such treaty — not using the term according to its stipulated meaning — set cruel rules and pointers that would only produce more violence and terror. The Treaty of Versailles was a do Many historians have disputed over the origins of World War I, who started it, who is to blame for the outbreak of the war? And there are no accurate answers to the questions.
To support the statement "Germany was responsible for the outbreak of World War I" to a full extent is During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were many technological advances that changed the way war was looked upon. War was no longer two opposing groups meeting in a field for a prearranged fight. It had evolved into a strategic game where the stronger your toys, the better your team fought. The industrial revolution had changed the way war was engaged, fought, and ended.
There are many things that contributed to the start of WW1. The war began in but the bitter feelings and tensions between countries had started much earlier For 20 years, the nations of Europe had been making alliances. It was thought that alliances would promote peace.
Each country would be protected by others in case of war. The danger of the alliances was that an argument b Compare and contrast the U. The underlying causes of the war was the nationalism that was found throughout Europe in the 19th and 20th century. There was political and economic rivalry among the nations. But the main "shot" that started the war was on June 28, Although it was seen as a European war, the Australia government decided that Australia should support its 'Mother Country', Britain.
The prime-minister at the time, Joseph Cook, stated Australia's position: To fight, you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of national life, infecting the Congress, the courts, the policeman on the The answer to this seemingly simple question is not elementary. There was more to the onset of the war then the event of an Austrian prince being murdered in Serbia, as is what most people consider to be the cause of World War I.
Furthermore, the effects of the war wer This was a totally justifiable demand on the part of the victorious powers. The Treaty of Versailles was enacted into history in June with Germany forced to accept sole responsibility for causing World War They were right in a way. The societies could not support a long war unchanged. The First World War left no aspect of Europ How the Treaty of Versailles Effected Germany Essay submitted by Unknown When World War I ended on November 11, , peace talks went on for months due to the Allied leaders wanting to punish the enemy and "dividing the spoils of war.
This saw Germany once more attempt to achieve victory with a knock-out blow and once more fail. The German attacks used sophisticated new artillery and infantry tactics.
They enjoyed spectacular success. The British 5th Army on the Somme suffered a major defeat. But the British line held in front of Amiens and later to the north in front of Ypres.
No real strategic damage was done. By midsummer the German attacks had petered out. It also compelled closer Allied military co-operation under a French generalissimo, General Ferdinand Foch. The Allied counter-offensive began in July. For the rest of the war in the west the Germans were in retreat. Here the distances involved were very great.
Artillery densities were correspondingly less. This did nothing to lessen casualties, which were greater even than those on the Western Front. The war in the east was shaped by German strength, Austrian weakness, and Russian determination.
German military superiority was apparent from the start of the war. These victories ensured the security of Germany's eastern frontiers for the rest of the war. They also established the military legend of Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, who emerged as principal directors of the German war effort in the autumn of These defeats proved costly to Russia.
They also proved costly to Austria. Austria had a disastrous war. Italian entry into the war compelled the Austrians to fight an three fronts: This proved too much for Austrian strength.
Their war effort was characterized by dependency on Germany. Germans complained that they were shackled to the 'Austrian corpse'. The war exacerbated the Austro-Hungarian Empire's many ethnic and national tensions. By Austria was weary of the war and desperate for peace.
This had a major influence on the German decision to seek a victory in the west in the spring of Perceptions of the Russian war effort have been overshadowed by the October Revolution of and by Bolshevik 'revolutionary defeatism' which acquiesced in the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 14 March and took Russia out of the war.
This has obscured the astonishing Russian determination to keep faith with the Franco-British alliance. Without the Russian contribution in the east it is far from certain that Germany could have been defeated in the west.
The unhesitating Russian willingness to aid their western allies is nowhere more apparent than in the 'Brusilov Offensive' June-September , which resulted in the capture of the Bukovina and large parts of Galicia, as well as , Austrian prisoners, but at a cost to Russia which ultimately proved mortal.
In southern Europe the Italian army fought eleven indecisive battles in an attempt to dislodge the Austrians from their mountain strongholds beyond the Isonzo river. In October Austrian reinforcement by seven German divisions resulted in a major Italian defeat at Caporetto. The Italians were pushed back beyond the Piave.
This defeat produced changes in the Italian high command. During Italy discovered a new unity of purpose and a greater degree of organization.
Austrian retreat turned into rout and then into surrender. In the Balkans the Serbs fought the Austrians and Bulgarians, suffering massive casualties, including the highest proportion of servicemen killed of any belligerent power. It struggled to have any influence on the war. The Germans mocked it and declared Salonika to be the biggest internment camp in Europe, but the French and British eventually broke out of the malarial plains into the mountainous valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers before inflicting defeat on Bulgaria in the autumn of In the Middle East British armies fought the Turks in a major conflict with far-reaching consequences.
Here the war was characterized by the doggedness of Turkish resistance and by the constant struggle against climate, terrain, and disease. The British attempted to knock Turkey out of the war with an attack on the Gallipoli peninsula in April , but were compelled to withdraw at the end of the year, having failed to break out from their narrow beach-heads in the face of stubborn Turkish resistance, coordinated by a German general, Liman von Sanders.
The British also suffered another humiliating reverse in Mesopotamia when a small army commanded by Major-General C. Townshend advanced to Ctesiphon but outran its supplies and was compelled to surrender at Kut-al-Amara in April Only after the appointment of Sir Stanley Maude to the command of British forces in Mesopotamia did Britain's superior military and economic strength begin to assert itself.
Maude's forces captured Baghdad in March , the first clear-cut British victory of the war. Turkey surrendered on 31 October The war also found its way to tropical Africa. Germany's colonies in West and south-west Africa succumbed to British and South African forces by the spring of In East Africa, however, a German army of locally raised black African soldiers commanded by Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck conducted a brilliant guerrilla campaign, leading over , British and South African troops a merry dance through the bush and surrendering only after the defeat of Germany in Europe became known.
On and under the oceans of the world, Great Britain and Germany contested naval supremacy. Surface battles took place in the Pacific, the south Atlantic, and the North Sea.
The British generally had the better of these despite suffering some disappointments, notably at Coronel 1 November and Jutland 31 May-1 June , the only major fleet engagement, during which Admiral Sir John Jellicoe failed to deliver the expected Nelsonic victory of total annihilation.
German resort to unrestricted submarine warfare February brought Britain to the verge of ruin. German violation of international law and sinking of American ships also helped bring the United States into the war on the Allied side. The British naval blockade of Germany, massively reinforced by the Americans from April , played an important role in German defeat. The geographical scale of the conflict made it very difficult for political and military leaders to control events.
The obligations of coalition inhibited strategic independence. Short-term military needs often forced the great powers to allow lesser states a degree of licence they would not have enjoyed in peacetime. Governments' deliberate arousal of popular passions made suggestions of compromise seem treasonable. The ever-rising cost of the military means inflated the political ends. Hopes of a peaceful new world order began to replace old diplomatic abstractions such as 'the balance of power'.
Rationality went out of season. War aims were obscured. Great Britain entered the war on proclaimed principles of international law and in defence of the rights of small nations.
By the British government was pursuing a Middle Eastern policy of naked imperialism in collaboration with the French , while simultaneously encouraging the aspirations of Arab nationalism and promising support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. It was truly a war of illusions.
This belief was not based on complacency. Even those who predicted with chilling accuracy the murderous nature of First World War battlefields, such as the Polish banker Jan Bloch, expected the war to be short. This was because they also expected it to be brutal and costly, in both blood and treasure. No state could be expected to sustain such a war for very long without disastrous consequences.
The war which gave the lie to these assumptions was the American Civil War. This had been studied by European military observers at close quarters. Most, however, dismissed it. This was particularly true of the Prussians.
Their own military experience in the wars against Austria and France seemed more relevant and compelling. These wars were both short. They were also instrumental. In the Germans sought to replicate the success of their Prussian predecessors. They aimed to fight a 'cabinet war' on the Bismarckian model. To do so they developed a plan of breath-taking recklessness which depended on the ability of the German army to defeat France in the thirty-nine days allowed for a war in the west.
Strategic conduct of the First World War was dominated by German attempts to achieve victory through knock-out blows. Erich von Falkenhayn, German commander-in-chief from September until August , was almost alone in his belief that Germany could obtain an outcome to the war satisfactory to its interests and those of its allies without winning smashing victories of total annihilation.
His bloody attempt to win the war by attrition at Verdun in did little to recommend the strategy to his fellow countrymen. The preference for knock-out blows remained. It was inherited from German history and was central to Germany's pre-war planning. Pre-war German strategy was haunted by the fear of a war on two fronts, against France in the west and Russia in the east.
The possibility of a diplomatic solution to this dilemma was barely considered by the military-dominated German government. A military solution was sought instead.
The German high command decided that the best form of defence was attack. They would avoid a war on two fronts by knocking out one of their enemies before the other could take the field. The enemy with the slowest military mobilization was Russia. The French army would be in the field first. France was therefore chosen to receive the first blow. Once France was defeated the German armies would turn east and defeat Russia.
The Schlieffen Plan rested on two assumptions: By the first assumption was untrue: Russia put an army into the field in fifteen days. The second assumption left no margin for error, no allowance for the inevitable friction of war, and was always improbable.
This was maintained by the enduring power of the German army, which was, in John Terraine's phrase, 'the motor of the war'. The German army was a potent instrument. It had played a historic role in the emergence of the German state. It enjoyed enormous prestige. It was able to recruit men of talent and dedication as officers and NCOs. As a result it was well trained and well led. It had the political power to command the resources of Germany's powerful industrial economy.
Germany's position at the heart of Europe meant that it could operate on interior lines of communication in a European war. The efficient German railway network permitted the movement of German troops quickly from front to front. The superior speed of the locomotive over the ship frustrated Allied attempts to use their command of the sea to operate effectively against the periphery of the Central Powers.
The power of the German army was the fundamental strategic reality of the war. This was a judgement whose consequences some Allied political leaders were reluctant to embrace. The German army suffered from two important strategic difficulties. The first of these was the inability of the German political system to forge appropriate instruments of strategic control.
The second was Great Britain. German government rested on the tortured personality of the Kaiser. It was riven by intrigue and indecision. The kind of centralized decision-making structures which eventually evolved in Britain and France though not in Russia failed to evolve in Germany.
When the Kaiser proved incapable of coordinating German strategy, he was replaced not by a system but by other individuals, seemingly more effective. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg radiated calm and inspired confidence.
This gave him the appearance of a great man but without the substance. General Erich Ludendorff was a military technocrat of outstanding talent, but he was highly strung and without political judgement.
In his offensive strategy brought Germany to ruin. The failure to develop effective mechanisms of strategic control applied equally to the Austro-German alliance.
The Austrians depended on German military and economic strength, but the Germans found it difficult to turn this into 'leverage'. Austria was willing to take German help but not German advice.
Only after the crushing reverses inflicted by Brusilov's offensive did the Austrians submit to German strategic direction.
By then it was almost certainly too late. Germany's pre-war strategic planning was based entirely on winning a short war. British belligerency made this unlikely. The British were a naval rather than a military power. They could not be defeated by the German army, at least not quickly. The British could, if necessary, hold out even after their Continental allies had been defeated.
They might even have chosen to do this. They had in the past and they would again in the not-too-distant future. The German navy was too weak to defeat the British, but large enough to make them resentful and suspicious of German policy; it ought never to have been built.
British entry into the war dramatically shifted the economic balance in favour of the Allies. Britain was one of the world's great industrial powers. Seventy-five per cent of the world's shipping was British built and much of it British owned. London was the world's greatest money and commodities market. British access to world supplies of food and credit and to imperial resources of manpower made them a formidable enemy, despite the 'contemptible little army' which was all they could put into the field on the outbreak of war.
From about mid onwards British economic, industrial, and manpower resources began to be fully mobilized. Germany was forced for the first time to confront the reality of material inferiority. Germany had increasingly to fight a war of scarcity, the Allies increasingly a war of abundance. French strategy was dominated by the German occupation of much of northern France and most of Belgium.
At its closest point the German line was less than 40 miles from Paris. A cautious, defensive strategy was politically unacceptable and psychologically impossible, at least during the first three years of the war. During and France sacrificed enormous numbers of men in the attempt to evict the Germans. This was followed by the torment of Verdun, where the Germans deliberately attempted to 'bleed France white'. French fears of military inferiority were confirmed.
If France was to prevail its allies would have to contribute in kind. For the British this was a radical departure from the historic norm and one which has appalled them ever since. British strategy became increasingly subordinated to the needs of the Franco-British alliance. The British fought the war as they had to, not as they wanted to. The British way in warfare envisaged a largely naval war.
A naval blockade would weaken Germany economically. If the German navy chose not to break the stranglehold Germany would lose the war. If it did choose to fight it would be annihilated. British maritime superiority would be confirmed. Neutral opinion would be cowed. Fresh allies would be encouraged into the fight. The blockade would be waged with greater ruthlessness. Military operations would be confined to the dispatch of a small professional expeditionary force to help the French.
Remaining military forces would be employed on the periphery of the Central Powers remote from the German army, where it was believed they would exercise a strategic influence out of all proportion to their size. The British never really fought the war they envisaged.
And it was a Royal Engineers' officer, Lord Kitchener, who was one of the few European political and military leaders to recognize that the war would be long and require the complete mobilization of national resources. Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War on 5 August He doubted whether the French and the Russians were strong enough to defeat Germany without massive British military reinforcement.
He immediately sought to raise a mass citizen army. There was an overwhelming popular response to his call to arms.
Kitchener envisaged this new British army taking the field in after the French and Russian armies had rendered the German army ripe for defeat. They would be 'the last million men'. They would win the war and decide the peace.
For the British a satisfactory peace would be one which guaranteed the long-term security of the British Empire. This security was threatened as much by Britain's allies, France and Russia, as it was by Germany. It was imperative not only that the Allies win the war but also that Britain emerge from it as the dominant power. Kitchener's expectations were disappointed.
By it was the French army which was ripe for defeat, not the German. But the obligations of the French alliance were inescapable.
The British could not afford to acquiesce in a French defeat. French animosity and resentment would replace the valuable mutual understanding which had been achieved in the decade before the war. The French had a great capacity for making imperial mischief. And so did the Russians. If they were abandoned they would have every reason for doing so. There seemed no choice. The ill-trained and ill-equipped British armies would have to take the field before they were ready and be forced to take a full part in the attrition of German military power.
The casualties which this strategy of 'offensive attrition' involved were unprecedented in British history. They were also unacceptable to some British political leaders. They looked to use it elsewhere, against Germany's allies in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Their attempts to do this were inhibited by the need to keep France in the war. This could only be done in France and by fighting the German army. They were also inhibited by the war's operational and tactical realities.
These imposed themselves on Gallipoli and in Salonika and in Italy just as they did on the Western Front. Attempts to implement an Allied grand strategy enjoyed some success. Allied political and military leaders met regularly. At Chantilly in December and December they determined to stretch the German army to its limits by simultaneous offensive action on the western, eastern, and Italian fronts.
Franco-British co-operation was especially close. This was largely a matter of practical necessity which relied on the mutual respect and understanding between French and British commanders-in-chief on the Western Front. The system worked well until the German Spring Offensive of threatened to divide the Allies. Only then was it replaced by a more formal structure.
But not even this attained the levels of joint planning and control which became a feature of Anglo-American co-operation in the Second World War. Allied grand strategy was conceptually sound. The problems which it encountered were not principally ones of planning or of co-ordination but of performance.
Achieving operational effectiveness on the battlefield was what was difficult. This has given the war, especially the war in the west, its enduring image of boneheaded commanders wantonly sacrificing the lives of their men in fruitless pursuit of impossibly grandiose strategic designs.
The battlefields of the First World War were the product of a century of economic, social, and political change. Europe in was more populous, more wealthy, and more coherently organized than ever before. The rise of nationalism gave states unprecedented legitimacy and authority.
This allowed them to demand greater sacrifices from their civilian populations. Improvements in agriculture reduced the numbers needed to work on the land and provided a surplus of males of military age. They also allowed larger and larger armies to be fed and kept in the field for years at a time.
Changes in administrative practice brought about by the electric telegraph, the telephone, the typewriter, and the growth of railways allowed these armies to be assembled and deployed quickly. Industrial technology provided new weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. Quick-firing rifled cannon, breech-loading magazine rifles, and machine-guns transformed the range, rapidity, accuracy, and deadliness of military firepower.
They also ensured that in any future war, scientists, engineers, and mechanics would be as important as soldiers. These changes did much to make the First World War the first 'modern war'.
But it did not begin as one. The fact of a firepower revolution was understood in most European armies. The consequences of it were not. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War appeared to offer a human solution to the problems of the technological battlefield.
World War I is considered by some, the first man-made catastrophe of the twentieth century. Many scholars still debate the underlying causes of World War I. There are many things that contributed to the war. The causes and effects of the war changed the lives of many people. Many of the effects of the war are still evident in today.
The Causes of World War 1 Essay Words | 4 Pages. World War 1 (better known as The Great War), was caused by a great many elements, some long-term, some short-term and the spark. Together these reasons created a brutal war involving many countries across the globe and also killing a vast number of the world’s population.
Essay on The First World War (WWI) - WORLD WAR ONE There has always been wars, and there will always be wars. Most wars leave a huge impact on the history of that nation, especialy if it involves more than one. - World War I, known as the Great War prior to World War II, was a global war which began in Europe on July and ended on November 11, The Central Power, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, were at war with the Allies, Great Britain, France, and Russia.
World War 1 started in Europe in the year and went though 4 years and ended in the year The war started out with an assassination of heir to the Austrian throne by a Serbian nationalist. Jan 11, · 9. World War 1 Essay world war 1 - Words. centercenter WOrld war 1 Abstract There were wars before this and there were many and will continue to be many wars after, but this would be the one that all other wars would be based on. A war .